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The aim of the proposed theoretical model is to illuminate personal and interpersonal
resilience by drawing from the field of emotional face perception. We suggest that
perception/recognition of emotional facial expressions serves as a central link between
subjective, self-related processes and the social context. Emotional face perception
constitutes a salient social cue underlying interpersonal communication and behavior.
Because problems in communication and interpersonal behavior underlie most, if not
all, forms of psychopathology, it follows that perception/recognition of emotional facial
expressions impacts psychopathology. The ability to accurately interpret one’s facial
expression is crucial in subsequently deciding on an appropriate course of action. However,
perception in general, and of emotional facial expressions in particular, is highly influenced
by individuals’ personality and the self-concept. Herein we briefly outline well-established
theories of personal and interpersonal resilience and link them to the neuro-cognitive
basis of face perception. We then describe the findings of our ongoing program of
research linking two well-established resilience factors, general self-efficacy (GSE) and
perceived social support (PSS), with face perception. We conclude by pointing out
avenues for future research focusing on possible genetic markers and patterns of brain
connectivity associated with the proposed model. Implications of our integrative model to
psychotherapy are discussed.
Keywords: angry expression, happy expression, general self-efficacy, perceived social support, biased emotion
recognition
The notion that individuals and social context actively shape
each other, evident in numerous conceptual perspectives, is
represented in Albert Bandura’s seminal principle of recip-
rocal determinism (Bandura, 1978; see also Shahar, 2006
for review of such action models in clinical psychology).
Herein we extend this notion by proposing an integrative
model that incorporates research on perception and recogni-
tion of emotional facial expressions. Specifically, we posit that
biased emotional face perception and its relation to individ-
uals’ personality and self- concepts may explain vulnerability
to, and resilience in the face of, a host of psychological
difficulties. We begin by providing a brief overview of the
well-established concepts that contributed to our overarching
model. We then describe findings emanating from our ongoing
program of research entitled Project PAVE (Personality And
Vision Experimentation) which link personal and interpersonal
resilience and perception of emotional facial expressions. We
conclude by noting avenues for future research focused on
possible genetic markers and patterns of brain connectivity asso-
ciated with the proposed model, as well as implications for
psychotherapy.
PERCEPTION OF FACIAL EXPRESSION AND ITS ROLE IN
VULNERABILITY TO, AND RESILIENCE IN THE FACE OF,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
As presented in Figure 1 (Step 1), mounting evidence in
social, developmental, and clinical psychology, inspired by
Bandura’s principle, highlight the active role of individu-
als in shaping their own environment, consequently, affecting
interpersonal relations, risk to psychopathologies or their self-
concept (Lerner, 1982; Swann, 1983, 1990; Buss, 1987; Hammen,
1991; Joiner, 1994; Wachtel, 1994; for review, see Shahar, 2006).
For example, depressed or self-critical individuals may gener-
ate interpersonal aversive circumstances that eventually main-
tain or elicit their depressive state and/or their self-criticism
(Joiner, 1994; Mongrain, 1998; Joiner et al., 1999; Zuroff
and Duncan, 1999; Priel and Shahar, 2000; Shahar and Priel,
2003; Blatt and Shahar, 2004; Shahar et al., 2004; Bareket-
Bojmel and Shahar, 2011; Shahar and STREALTH LAB, in
press).
But what is the mechanism underlying these findings? Accord-
ing to some social theories, individuals form their self-concept, at
least in part, based on the ways others observe them and relate to
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FIGURE 1 | The proposed theoretical model suggesting biased emotional face perception as the putative underlying mechanism of the reciprocal
connections between personality/self-concept, interpersonal relations and resilience to psychopathology. See the boxes in the right panel for the
related steps that led us to develop this overarching model.
them (e.g., the looking glass; Cooley, 1902). A similar notion was
also postulated by the well-known psychoanalyst Winnicott in his
theory regarding “mirroring” (1971), according to which infants
form their sense of self by mentally absorbing their mother’s
facial expression as she attends to them. Relatedly, according to
Swann’s self-verification theory, people are motivated to search
for evidence confirming their self-concept, and this motivation
influences perceptual information processing (Snyder and Swann,
1978; Murray et al., 2000) as well as social interactions (Swann
et al., 1989, 1994). Specifically, depressed individuals are more
prone to interactions with partners who perceived them unfa-
vorably and were indeed more alienated and rejected than non-
depressed individuals (Swann et al., 1992).
Another approach for understanding this vicious cycle comes
from Beck’s cognitive model, stating that depressed individu-
als are likely to process information in a dysfunctional man-
ner and this biased acquisition and processing style contribute
to the maintenance of their psychopathology (Beck, 1967,
2008). Studies supporting this notion stress the causal role of
biased attention in increased emotional vulnerability and inves-
tigate how interventions that modulate biased processing affect
psychopathological disorders (for a related review see Mathews
and MacLeod, 2002; Browning et al., 2010; Hakamata et al.,
2010; Wells et al., 2010, and special section on cognitive bias
modification in The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Koster
et al., 2009, but see Hallion and Ruscio, 2011). For example,
the induction of an attentional bias by manipulating the loca-
tion of threatening/neutral words prior to the presentation of
to be detected probes using the dot probe paradigm, modified
individuals’ response time and consequently affected their mood
during a standardized stress manipulation. Specifically, the group
that was biased toward threat by being presented with threat-
ening words prior to the probe, exhibited a greater increase
in negative mood during the following stress task, compared
to the group presented with neutral words (MacLeod et al.,
2002).
Thus, previous studies imply that biased information
processing and specifically, social-emotional information, may
play a primary role in the development and maintenance of
psychopathology, (Beck, 1967; Mathews and MacLeod, 2005;
Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2009; Disner et al., 2011; Roiser
et al., 2012)—in turn affecting interpersonal relations (Swann
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et al., 1992; Shahar, 2006). This process is illustrated in Step 2 of
Figure 1.
Previous studies have attested to segments of the processes
presented in Figure 1. For example, anxiety has been associated
with the tendency to attend to threatening information [e.g., the
emotional Stroop (Stroop, 1935), the dot probe task (MacLeod
et al., 1986) and the emotional spatial cuing paradigm (Fox et al.,
2001), for further elaborations on these tasks see reviews by Bar-
Haim et al., 2007; Cisler and Koster, 2010]. Using the dot probe
paradigm (see description above), it has been demonstrated that
individuals with a general anxiety disorder are faster to respond to
probes replacing threat words, than neutral words, as compared to
controls (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg et al., 1992). Similarly,
depression was associated with a bias toward negative congru-
ent information, mostly due to a difficulty in disengaging from
information with a negative valence (for reviews see Gotlib et al.,
2004; Mathews and MacLeod, 2005; Clark et al., 2009; Gotlib and
Joormann, 2010; Disner et al., 2011; Roiser et al., 2012). Relatedly,
in the emotional Stroop task, in which participants’ response
time to name the color of an emotional written word indicates
their ability to disengage from the emotional context, depressed
patients were slower to name the color of negative emotional
words, compared to non-depressed controls (Gotlib and McCann,
1984; Broomfield et al., 2007).
In relation to the above, Roiser et al. (2012) proposed a
cognitive neuropsychological approach for the understanding and
treatment of depression. This model is based on a presumed
casual chain linking negative information processing (e.g., biased
emotional perception, attention and memory) to the develop-
ment of symptoms of depression. Presumably, such a cogni-
tive bias is affected by alterations in biological factors (e.g.,
monoamine transmission via different brain circuits involved in
affective regulation and processing) and their interactions with
both environmental and genetic factors (see the detailed model in
Roiser et al., 2012). Importantly, this model was based on results
obtained from a longitudinal design (Forbes et al., 2007) as well
as on studies conducted with individuals at risk for developing
depression, or on ones that recover from it (see Roiser et al., 2012).
Within this general theoretical template, our own particular
contribution lies in the focus on biased processing of emotional
facial expressions as depicted in Step 3 of Figure 1.
Given its unique evolutionary and social significance, face
perception is probably the most multifaceted visual perceptual
skill in humans. In addition to invariant information such as
identity and gender, faces convey a large amount of subtle, variant,
changeable information such as age (Ishai, 2008), expressions
(Fox et al., 2000), intentions (van’t Wout and Sanfey, 2008) and
mood (Adolphs, 2003) upon which human observers rely for
social interaction and communication. A wealth of behavioral
literature posits that this efficient and multifaceted processing
of faces is accomplished in a qualitatively different fashion com-
pared to the processing of other object categories. Specifically,
deriving a rapid and accurate representation of the face requires
a disproportionate reliance on the configuration of the physical
features of the face relative to that required for non-face object
recognition (Behrmann et al., in press). This holistic processing
is considered a hallmark of face perception (Farah et al., 1995;
Richler et al., 2011; Behrmann et al., in press; DeGutis et al.,
2013). Neuroimaging studies in humans collectively point to a
number of “core regions” that show selective responses associated
with the visual invariant, as well as variant, properties of faces.
Additionally, there are a number of regions outside the occipito-
temporal cortex that constitute an “extended” face recognition
system with unique roles in processing high-level attributes of
face perception such as memory and emotion (Haxby et al., 2000;
Gobbini and Haxby, 2007; Ishai, 2008).
Of all the different types of information embedded in the face,
facial expressions are of most relevance to the present investi-
gation. Emotional face perception constitutes a key mechanism
for social communication which is crucial for forming appro-
priate actions during social interactions (Öhman and Mineka,
2001; Haxby et al., 2002; Russell et al., 2003). Individuals’ facial
expressions allude to the expresser emotional state and may elicit
a similar response in the observer (Haxby et al., 2002). The
preference to look at face-like stimuli can be observed in new-
borns (Johnson et al., 1991), and first signs of facial expression
recognition abilities are witnessed during the first year of life
(Walker-Andrews, 1997; De Haan and Nelson, 1998; Farroni et al.,
2007). Moreover, the process of recognizing an emotion from a
face in order to produce a conceptual knowledge of this expression
was suggested to involve areas in the core and extended systems via
their anatomical and functional connections (Adolphs, 2002).
Furthermore, and most pertinent to our proposed model,
psychopathological disorders were shown to be closely associated
with biased processing of emotional face stimuli (see Mathews
and MacLeod, 2005; Cisler and Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010,
for reviews). For example, individuals suffering from comor-
bid anxiety and depression recognized angry expressions better
than happy and neutral expressions, a pattern that is reversed
compared to controls (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2002). Addi-
tionally, Jermann et al. (2008) reported a positive correlation
between depressive symptoms and the conscious recollection of
sad expressions. Moreover, socially phobic patients better recalled
faces that they judged as “critical” at the learning phase, while
non-anxious controls performed better with faces that were
judged as “safe” (Lundh and Öst, 1996; Coles and Heimberg,
2005).
The notion of biased attention toward recognition of facial
expressions is also related to the idea that individuals’ thoughts
and feelings about themselves are closely related to the way in
which they believe others perceive them (Cooley, 1902; Sullivan,
1953; Shraugher and Schoeneman, 1979). Moreover, the way
individuals perceive themselves affect the way they perceive others
(Swann, 1983, 1990; Leary, 1990). This notion is well captured
in the seminal quote by Merleau-Ponty (1964) “I begin to live
my intentions in the facial expressions of the other and likewise
begin to live the other’s volitions in my own gestures” (p. 119).
Thus, through the prism of emotional face perception which is
shaped by one’s own self-views, individuals interpret their social
environments, and this subjective interpretation, may in turn
affect psychopathology and project back on their self-perception.
But what about resilience to psychopathology? Individuals
have the ability to adapt, cope and maintain a stable equilibrium
in the face of life stressors (Rutter, 1985; Richardson, 2002;
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Bonanno, 2004; Shahar et al., 2012). Yet, the question of why
some people are more emotionally resilient than others still awaits
an answer. We suggest that the relation between resilience factors
such as personality traits or social variables, and processing of
emotional face perception may be informative for understanding
risk/resilience to psychopathology in terms of prevention: by
investigating what makes some people more immune to the effects
of negative valence or alternatively, more subjected to positive
valence, we may be able to identify those individuals who are most
vulnerable to adverse circumstances (Hauser et al., 2006; Shahar,
2012). Step 4 of Figure 1 depicts our full-fledged model.
A number of factors have been associated with resilience,
among them having high self-esteem or self-efficacy (Garmezy,
1991; Werner and Smith, 1992; Rutter, 1993; Masten, 1994),
having emotional stability, extraversion or agreeableness (Friborg
et al., 2005) and reporting elevated levels of perceived social
support (PSS; Cohen and Wills, 1985; Kessler et al., 1985; Cohen
et al., 2000; Cohen, 2004; Uchino, 2006; Lakey and Orehek, 2011).
These factors were shown to contribute to positive outcomes and
protect against negative ones. For example, social support has
been shown to protect against a wide variety of adverse outcomes
including depression (Lakey and Cronin, 2008), post-traumatic
stress disorder (Brewin et al., 2000), and physical illness (Uchino,
2006) and to promote positive consequences such as self-care
(Graven and Grant, 2014), coping strategies (Cohen and Wills,
1985; Davis and Swan, 1999; Wills and Fegan, 2001) self-control
(Wills and Bantum, 2012) and optimism (Karademas, 2006).
Importantly, there is almost no research on the possible under-
lying mechanisms mediating these effects particularly from the
neuro-cognitive perspective, let alone focusing on face perception.
PROJECT PAVE
Project PAVE was launched in order to examine our proposed link
between vulnerability/resilience, emotional face perception, and
self/social functioning. In the following sections we will describe
the findings emanating from this project and note some future
directions and implications.
First, we examined the associations between general self-
efficacy (GSE), a central dimension of personal resilience pertain-
ing to individuals’ positive beliefs about their own capabilities
(Bandura, 1997). We hypothesized that happy facial expression
may signal approval by others, which should be congruent with
the preceptor’s high self-worth. Thus, we predicted that GSE
would be positively correlated with accurate recognition of happy
facial expression.
To test our hypotheses, we used a morph technique that
merged between two emotional stimuli to create a new image
containing a specified percentage from each of the original stimuli
(see Figure 2). This method enabled us to assess both accuracy
and bias depending on the morph level of the dominant expres-
sion. Participants (n = 70) were asked to classify the expression
presented in each trial. Accuracy was determined by the dominant
expression within each morph blend. Prior to the behavioral
task, participants completed a battery of questionnaires assessing
their self-efficacy and depressive symptoms. As predicted, and
even after controlling for depressive symptoms (in this, as well
as in all other studies described below), individuals with high
self-efficacy showed a specific bias towards recognition of happy
facial expressions. We interpreted this effect as a way to maintain
and form affirming relations, which may serve as a protective
factor during stress (Tanzer et al., 2013a).
Next, we hypothesized that happy facial expression would be
better memorized compared to angry expressions, as the former
may serve as a potential shelter, one could lean on and recall
in a time of need. Thus we conducted another study in which
participants (n = 92) were asked to memorize faces portraying
happy/angry expressions and then (after a short interval) to recall
which face was previously presented and retrieve the portrayed
expression. As expected, GSE was positively correlated with bet-
ter identity recognition for faces portraying a happy expression
during the learning phase and with the tendency to recall the
learned expression as happy. Taken together, our findings suggest
that individuals with high GSE are tuned, in terms of both recog-
nition and memory, to “happy others”, possibly as a way of self-
verification of their own positive self-views. This self-efficacious
prism, through which one interprets his/her surrounding, may
reduce stress and protect against potential hazards, consequently
minimizing the risk for psychopathology (Tanzer et al., 2013a).
In our next line of studies we sought to examine other protec-
tive factors that are more related to the social context. Inspired by
theories linking cognitive processes to interpersonal relationships
(Leary, 1990, 2005; Pickett et al., 2004; Pickett and Gardner,
2005), we focused on PSS. PSS refers to the interpersonal network
of resources that is available to individuals to provide help during
time of need (Cohen and Wills, 1985; Lakey and Cronin, 2008;
Lakey and Orehek, 2011). Based on the known role of PSS as
a main protective factor against a wide range of negative life
events or as a stress buffer minimizing their aversive outcomes
(e.g., Cohen and Wills, 1985; Theran et al., 2006; Lakey and
Cronin, 2008; Shahar et al., 2009; Lakey and Orehek, 2011), we
predicted that it would be negatively associated with recognition
of an angry expression, as the latter is a sign of threat one
should avoid. Using the morph paradigm again, we now morphed
between angry and neutral facial expressions and indeed found
that individuals (n = 71) with elevated levels of PSS were less
accurate in recognizing angry facial expressions (Tanzer et al.,
Submitted). Thus, positive PSS emerged as a protective factor that
enables individuals to monitor their environments and overlook
angry facial expressions, arguably being more open to positive and
rewarding exchanges.
We also examined the impact of PSS on emotional face pro-
cessing in a stressful situation by a failure/success manipulation
(for details regarding the manipulation see Mendelson and Gruen,
2005; Tanzer et al., 2013b). Participants (n = 142) first filled
questionnaires assessing their PSS and depressive symptoms and
were then randomly allocated to a failure or a success condition,
and accordingly were lead to believe they either failed or succeed
at the Raven intelligence test (Raven et al., 1985). We hypothe-
sized that PSS would act as a protective shield against hazards
(e.g., an angry facial expression) in a time of need (e.g., the
failure condition). Following the failure/success manipulation,
they participated in the morph experiment that enabled assessing
the accuracy and bias involved in recognition of emotional facial
expressions (Figure 2). As expected, we found that in the failure
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FIGURE 2 | Example of morph stimuli used in the experiments. The original stimuli (AM01) were taken from the KDEF database (Lundqvist et al., 1998). In
this example stimuli are comprised from angry and happy faces morphed together to create a continuum of blending.
group (i.e., where individuals were bogusly believed they failed
an intelligence test alluding to their self-worth), participants with
elevated levels of PSS, as compared to those with low levels of
PSS, were less accurate in recognizing angry facial expression,
possibly as a way to maintain their self-worth during a time of
need (Tanzer et al., 2013b).
In a similar fashion, we continued our investigation and exam-
ined how induced social support interacts with individuals’ self-
worth (i.e., GSE) in relation to recognition of an angry facial
expression. Participants first completed questionnaires assessing
their GSE, PSS and depressive symptoms (n = 54). They then
took part in an imagery task, where they were asked to visualize
a close partner or someone else who betrayed them in a time
of need. Following this manipulation, they participated in the
morph experiment. We predicted that both elements (i.e., positive
support and elevated levels of GSE) would act synergistically to
produce a bias against negative social cues (i.e., an angry facial
expression). Such an intriguing interaction was indeed found
and interpreted as a “protective shield” enabling individuals to
monitor their surroundings in order to avoid recognition of angry
expressions which consequently improve their well-being (Tanzer
et al., Submitted).
CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Taken together, these biases towards positive (e.g., happy
expressions) facial expressions or against negative ones (e.g.,
angry expressions) may suggest biased emotional face pro-
cessing as an underlying mechanism of the chain that leads
from personality/self-concepts or interpersonal relations to
risk/resilience to psychopathology. Protective factors (e.g., GSE
and PSS), may serve as a “narrow” adaptive prism through which
one interprets his/her surroundings. This biased perception, may
consequently lead to selective attention to, or dismissal of, specific
aspects of the environment, which eventually generate benevolent
effects and reduce maladaptive ones. Whereas research on biased
face processing in clinical populations has developed tremen-
dously in the past decade (e.g., Mathews and MacLeod, 2005;
Cisler and Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010, for reviews), research on
individual differences within the non-clinical populations is still
in its infancy, and we suggest that focusing on the latter would
open up an important avenue for better understanding of human
behavior that in turn, may promote psychotherapy interventions.
Our suggested model emanated from different theories in
diverse subfields of psychology (i.e., clinical, social and cognitive)
and neuroscience. Thus, we were inspired from Bandura (1978)
on reciprocal determinism and the perspective of action the-
ory that stresses individuals’ role in actively shaping their own
environment (Lerner, 1982; Brandstadter, 1998; Shahar, 2006).
Additionally, we built upon Winnicott’s notion of the mirroring
role of the mother as a vehicle for self-knowledge (Winnicott,
1971; see also Shahar and STREALTH LAB, in press), on social-
clinical theories which aimed to explain how individuals construct
self-views (e.g., the looking glass; Cooley, 1902), and how these
self-views affect individuals’ perception [self-verification theory
(Swann, 1983, 1990)]. Moreover, we were influenced by theories
on biased cognition such as Beck’s notion on individuals’ dysfunc-
tional schemes and its effect on information processing. Finally,
we were inspired by our vast interest in face processing, in relation
to cognitive and developmental aspects (Behrmann and Avidan,
2005; Behrmann et al., in press; Avidan and Behrmann, 2014).
As is evident, even when designing the most “basic” cognitive
paradigm, one should bear in mind the existence of individual
differences and the interplay between individuals’ self and their
outer subjective surrounding and these factors should be taken
into account.
Our theoretical model alludes to neural mechanisms that may
be involved in emotional face perception. While an extensive
review of the vast literature on the neural basis of face per-
ception lies outside the scope of this brief article (see Haxby
et al., 2000; Gobbini and Haxby, 2007; Ishai, 2008; Rossion,
2014), we wish to point out the importance of focusing on the
amygdala, known for its role in emotional face processing and its
vast direct and indirect connections to cortical and subcortical
structures, thus making it an important neural “hub” (LeDoux,
2000; Davis and Whalen, 2001). Specifically, it has been suggested
that regulation of emotional stimuli may be accomplished by
the reciprocal connections between the amygdala and orbital
and ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (Adolphs, 2002; Vuilleumier,
2005). This coupling between the amygdala and prefrontal areas
was in the focus of numerous studies, implicating its associa-
tion with genetic individual differences [(i.e., genetic polymor-
phism), Hariri et al., 2002] and more specifically with allelic
variation in the promotor region of the serotonin transporter
gene (5-HTTLPR). For example, carriers of the s-allele, compared
with the l-allele, of 5-HTTLPR showed elevated hemodynamic
response to fearful expressions during fMRI scans (Hariri et al.,
2002), which was associated with reduced coupling between the
amygdala and the subgenual cingulate gyrus (Pezawas et al.,
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2005). Interestingly, an attentional bias toward happy facial
expressions was associated with carrying of the “l” allele (Pérez-
Edgar et al., 2010), thus possibly implicating this genetic variable
as a potential protective factor against stressful life events (Fox
et al., 2009).
Evidence more pertinent to our presented model and to the
suggested future directions comes from studies that reported
that the strength of the functional connections (as assessed with
fMRI) between the amygdala and medial prefrontal areas was
associated with the size of one’s social network (Bickart et al.,
2012), as well as to diverse psychopathologies (e.g., anxiety: Kim
et al., 2011a,b). Moreover, amygdala activation in response to
happy facial expression was associated with the personality trait
extraversion (Canli et al., 2002; Canli, 2004), that might have
some associations with generalized self-efficacy. Furthermore, PSS
was found to moderate the relation between amygdala activity in
response to fearful and angry facial expressions and anxiety trait,
such that only low PSS predicted the relation between amygdala
activity and anxiety trait (Hyde et al., 2011).
Taken together, these different findings call for future studies
that will enable their integration into a single comprehensive
framework using diverse methodologies to measure functional
signal in face related regions and the connectivity between these
regions, as well as genetic, self and face processing measures.
We hypothesize that individual differences in variables associated
with self-concept will manifest in cognitive processing biases that
would be related to gene polymorphism accompanied by varia-
tions in the coupling of amygdala and frontal areas. Accordingly,
resilient individuals will show lower amygdala reactivity to angry
faces, and this reactivity would be due to enhanced suppression
from frontal areas.
Another related brain region that is considered part of the
extended face processing network is the insula, known for its
involvement in affective processing (Adolphs, 2002) and empa-
thy (Wicker et al., 2003; Adolphs, 2009; Singer and Lamm,
2009). Consistently with this account, the abilities to recog-
nize and experience facial expressions (specifically disgust) are
impaired in individuals with bilateral lesions in the insular
cortex (Calder et al., 2000; Adolphs et al., 2003). In addition
to these roles, that may be mediated by the connectivity of
the insular cortex to the amygdala, this region is also con-
sidered part of the visceral somatosensory cortex and hence
may be involved in modulating introspective information (Craig,
2002, 2008) as well as mediating responses to aversive stim-
uli (Phillips et al., 2003a). Thus, in light of our findings, and
emanating from the notion that self-perception affects how
individuals modulate their outer surrounding, future studies
linking the insula activation and functional connectivity during
emotional face recognition and its associations with self/social
variables are warranted. Importantly, previous findings already
allude to such an association; for example, insula activation
during emotional recognition was associated with trait anxi-
ety (Stein et al., 2007), social phobia (Gentili et al., 2008),
schizophrenia and affective disorders (for review see Phillips et al.,
2003b).
Moreover, future longitudinal studies should enable the con-
struction of a more cohesive map of the relations in our proposed
model. Such a line of inquiry is also expected to illuminate other
alternative explanations, for example that biased perception may
serve as a consequence factor (Koster et al., 2009) being influenced
by either/both psychopathology and/or resilience (MacLeod et al.,
2002; Mathews and MacLeod, 2005; Yiend, 2010). We stress that
even though all of our studies were conducted on a non-clinical
population and we controlled for depressive symptoms (Tanzer
et al., 2013a,b, Submitted), we cannot completely rule out other
probable explanations such as the possibility that previous psy-
chopathological conditions (e.g., anxiety or affective disorders)
might have accounted for some of the bias found in our results.
Also, individuals’ past experiences and exposure to their care-
givers’ facial expressions might not only influence how these
individuals form their sense of self, but also the saliency of these
expressions later on. For example, it has been demonstrated that
maltreated children directed their attention away from angry
faces, as compared to controls, and interestingly, this bias to avoid
threatening stimuli was dependent on the severity of the physical
abuse they suffered from (Pine et al., 2005). Also, as suggested
above, future studies focusing on genetic markers and their inter-
action with self-variables in association with biased face process-
ing, may shed more light on other possible explanations emanated
from the nurture vs. nature problem (i.e., consequences vs.
predispositions). Nevertheless, our experimental-manipulation
alludes to the suggested interpretations that self/social variables
serve as predispositions that may lead to a cognitive bias for
emotional face perception (i.e., consequence) which may affect
risk/resilience to psychopathology and not vice versa. Moreover,
previous studies that examined these associations and explored
psychological interventions to alter biased processing, found sup-
portive evidence for such a causal link among healthy populations
(Mathews and MacLeod, 2002; MacLeod et al., 2002; Browning
et al., 2007, 2010; Murphy et al., 2009; Hakamata et al., 2010; Wells
et al., 2010).
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